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ABSTRACT
A standard model of addictive process is Becker and Murphy's "rational addiction" model, which
has the key empirical prediction that the cunent consumption of addictive goods should respond to future
prices, and the key normative prediction that the optimal government regulation of addictive goods should
depend only on their interpersonal externalities. While a variety of previous studies have supported this
empirical contention, we demonstrate that these results are very fragile. We propose a new empirical test
for the case of cigarettes, using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not
yet effective, and monthly data on consumption. We find strong evidence that consumption drops when
there are announced future tax increases, providing more robust support for the key empirical prediction
of the Becker and Murphy model. But we also propose a new formulation of this model that makes only
one change, albeit a major one: the incorporation of the inconsistent preferences which are likely to provide
a much better platform for understanding the smoking decision. We find that with these preferences the
model continues to yield the predictions for forward-looking behavior that have been tested by others and
by ourselves. But it has strikingly different normative implications, as with these preferences optimal
government policy should depend as well on the "internalities" imposed by smokers on themselves. We
estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our
formulation than in the rational addiction case.
Jonathan Gruber Botond Koszegi
MIT Department of Economics MIT
E52-355 E52-262a
50 Memorial Drive 50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
and NBER koszegi@mit.edu
grubeij@mit.edu1 Introduction
Many of the habits that pervade everyday life can be properly described as addictive. While
the degree of addictiveness varies from activity to activity and person to person, habits such as
smoking, drinking, eating, exercise and a host of others often meet the two conditions required
for addiction: reinforcement, in that the more you partake of the activity, the more you want to
partake; and tolerance, in that the more that you partake of the activity, the lower your future
utility given the amount of future consumption (Becker and Murphy, [3]). The importance of
addiction for a variety of aspects of consumption behavior has led to a long standing interest in
modeling addictive processes. Most of the literature in this area until the mid-1980s modeled
addiction as habit formation, capturing the reinforcement aspect of the process through an effect
of lagged consumption on the taste for today's consumption of the good.
In a pathbreaking article, Becker and Murphy [3] explored the detailed dynamic behavior of the
consumption of addictive goods, and pointed out that many phenomena previously thought to have
been irrational are consistent with optimization according to stable preferences. In the Becker and
Murphy model, individuals recognize the addictive nature of choices that they make, but may still
make them because the gains from the activity exceed any costs through future addiction. That is,
in this rational addiction framework, individuals recognize the full price of addictive consumption
goods: both the current monetary price, and the cost in terms of future addiction.
This model of rational addiction has subsequently become the standard approach to modeling
consumption of goods such as cigarettes. This standard has been reinforced by a sizeable empirical
literature, beginning with Becker, Grossman and Murphy (BGM, [4]), which has tested and gener-
ally supported the key empirical contention of the Becker and Murphy model: that consumption
of addictive goods today will depend not only on past consumption but on future consumption as
well. More specifically, this literature has generally assessed whether higher prices next year lead to
lower consumption today, as would be expected with forward looking addicts. The fairly consistent
findings across a variety of papers that this is the case has led to the acceptance of this framework
for modeling addiction.
These past tests, however, run into a number of critical empirical and theoretical problems. On
1the empirical side, they rely on the assumption that individuals are appropriatelyforecasting prices
far in advance (as much as one year); as we document below, for cigarettes at least,very few price
increases are announced this far in advance. More fundamentally, inmany other applications, the
fact that the lead of a price variable affects current behavior is taken as the failure ofa specification
test of the model, not as evidence of forward looking behavior.
Finally, even if forward looking behavior can be demonstrated convincingly, there is a more
fundamental theoretical problem: forward looking behavior does not imply time consistency. Akey
assumption of the rational addiction framework is that individuals are time consistent; their future
behavior coincides with their current desires regarding this behavior. But recent developments in
behavioral economics have suggested that attention be paid to alternative, time inconsistent models
which may be more appropriate for modeling addiction. Importantly, except in extremecases, these
models also imply forward looking consumption decisions. Yet, the implications of these models
for government policy are radically different. In particular, while the rational addiction model
implies that the optimal tax on addictive bads should depend only on the externalities that their
use imposes on society, the time inconsistent alternative suggests a much higher tax that depends
also on the "internalities" that use imposes on consumers.
The purpose of our paper is to address both these empirical and theoretical issues with the
rational addiction literature, in the context of cigarette consumption. We begin bydocumenting
the problems with previous tests of rational addiction models, and show that sensiblechanges to
the specification completely destroy evidence of adjacent complementarity. We thensuggest an
alternative test: examining how consumption changes when a tax change isactually announced,
but not yet effective. We do so using monthly data on cigaretteconsumption, as well as sales,
matched to information on the enactment and effective dates of all state levelcigarette excise tax
increases over the recent past. We find, in fact, that in this framework there is evidence for forward
looking behavior; cigarette consumption does fall when future price increases are announced but
not yet effective. This finding is also robust to the specification tests whichprove difficult for
previous tests to pass.
We then turn to developing an alternative model which is also consistent with forwardlooking
consumption decisions. We do so by embedding in the Becker-Murphy framework the hyperbolic
2discounting preferences pioneered by Laibson [19]. These preferences provide a sensible parameter-
ization which allows us to maintain the optimizing features of the Becker-Murphy framework, while
considering time inconsistency in the decision to smoke. We find that this model also generates the
prediction that future prices matter for today's consumption; indeed, they matter in ways that are
sufficiently similar to the Becker-Murphy model that we are unable to empirically distinguish the
two with our data. Yet, we show that this model can deliver very different implications for govern-
ment policy; our simulaticins suggest that the optimal tax can be at least a dollar higher for modest
time inconsistency in this framework. We also develop a host of additional interesting implications
for government policy that arise from this alternative framework for modeling addiction.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Part II, we review both the Becker-Murphy model and the
related empirical literature, and document the failure of the previous empirical framework to deliver
a convincing test of forward looking behavior. In Part III, we describe our empirical strategy for
testing for forward looking behavior, and we implement this test in Part IV. Part V develops our
alternative model of time inconsistent addiction, Part VI solves the model, and Part VII explores
the implications of price changes in this framework. Part VIII discusses the implications of the
different models for government policy.
2 Previous Work
Models of the consumption of addictive goods have a long tradition. Most of the literature until
the mid-1980s focused on the habit formation, or reinforcement, aspect of addictive processes.
This aspect leads naturally to the prediction that current consumption of addictive goods will be
dependent on the path of past consumption, and a number of articles have demonstrated for goods
like cigarettes this backwards-looking intertemporal correlation .
Beckerand Murphy [3] presented a novel analysis which greatly advanced the modeling of
addictive processes. The key insight of their model was that just because a good is addictive,
there is no reason that its consumption can't be analyzed in a standard rationally optimizing
framework. Their "rational addicts", in making consumption decisions, recognize that there is a
1SeeChaloupka and Warner [10] for a superb review of both the theoretical and empirical literatures in this area.
3tradeoff with current consumption: while utility rises today from the consumption, long run utility
is lower because the individual is building up a stock of the addictive good that has a negative
marginal utility. Individuals rationally trade off these factors to consider the appropriate level of
consumption of addictive goods.
A key implication of this model is that consumption behavior should exhibit "adjacent com-
plementarity". Reinforcement arises here through the fact that a larger stock of past consumption
raises the marginal utility of current consumption. Thus, the fact that individuals are going to pur-
sue the activity in the future should increase the pursuit today, so as to increase the enjoyment of
the activity next period. This insight has led to the central empirical test of the rational addiction
model: asking whether consumption today is dependent on consumption tomorrow.
The first paper to carry out this test was Becker, Grossman, and Murphy [4], focusing on
cigarette smoking as an addictive behavior. They compile a dataset of cigarette consumption and
prices across the U.S. states over the 1955 through 1985 period, and match that to information
on cigarette prices across the states. They then estimate models of current consumption as a
function of current prices, consumption in the previous year, and consumption in the nextyear.
They recognize the important problem that consumption in both the past and the future are
endogenous, and propose an instrumental variables strategy that uses both past and future prices
and taxes as instruments. Doing so, they find significant effects of future consumption on current
consumption, supporting the forward looking behavior implied by the Becker and Murphy model.
This type of test has been carried out by a variety of subsequent studies, on both cigarettes and
other substances 2
Toinform our discussion of their results, we have replicated the BGM test using data updated
through 1997. We have used their same source for consumption, price, and tax information, the
(now defunct) Tobacco Institute's volume The Tax Burden On Tobacco, and have followed their
methodology with respect to the construction of the tax and price variables used .Wedo not
2Aless than comprehensive list includes Chaloupka [9], Sung, Hu, and Keeler [33], Waters and Sloan [36], Olekains
and Bardsley [29], Grossman and Chaloupka [16], and Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan [16]. See Chaloupka and
Warner [10] for a review.
In particular, they construct the average state excise tax rate during the fiscal year over which consumption is
measured, using monthly tax data; they incorporate (average) municipal as well as statewide cigarette excise taxes;
and they take a weighted average of lagged and current annual price data, incorporating the actual taxes in place
over the fiscal year.
4include their control variables for income and smuggling, but as we can replicate their basicpattern
of results these do not appear critical. All price and tax coefficients are in 1967 dollars,following
BGM.
The results of this replication are presented in Table 1. The first column shows BGM's column
(1) from Table 3 on page 406 of their 1994 article, with lagged and leaded consumption instrumented
by lagged and leaded prices. The second column shows our replication, extending the data through
1997. Our pattern of findings is very similar: significant coefficients on both lagged and lead
consumption, with the latter roughly one-third as large as the former.
In the next column, we show the reduced form equivalent of this regression. As would be
expected, there is a significant negative coefficient on the future price, consistent with the ad-
jacent complementarity predictions of the Becker and Murphy model. That is, as future prices
rise, individuals will know that they will desire lower consumption tomorrow, so they lower their
consumption today.
Unfortunately, this test runs into a host of problems. First, conceptually, it is difficult to
conceive of individuals being able to forecast well future prices in their state of residence, even if
they simply are trying to forecast tax changes. As we document in more detail below, excise tax
changes are rarely known one year in advance; only 8 of 160 tax changes over the 1973-96 period
were enacted as far as one year in advance. For individuals to forecast prices this far into the future
would require a very sophisticated model of expectations.
Second, the dependent variable is sales of cigarettes, not consumption; in particular, thisrepre-
sents sales from wholesalers to retail distributors of cigarettes .Ifindividuals really did anticipate
future price changes, then the expected direction of the response is not obvious; to the extent that
individuals wish to stockpile cigarettes while they are less expensive, consumption couldactually
rise in anticipation of price increases.
At an annual frequency, this may not be a majorconcern, due to cigarette quality deterioration
for long periods of storage. But this point interacts with the previous one: if theprice change is far
in the future, there is unlikely to be stockpiling, but the change is alsounlikely to be anticipated; 'Whilethe other criticisms levied here apply to all of the studies in this literature, this one only applies to the
subset of studies that use aggregate sales, rather than individual consumption, data.
5if the price change is in the near term, then anticipation is more likely, but so is stockpiling.
Third, there may be endogeneity bias to regressing the quantity of cigarettes consumed on
their price. This bias is likely to be small, since the primary determinant in within-state specific
price changes is changes in excise taxes; existing evidence suggests that excise tax changes are
passed through on a slightly more than one-for-one basis (Federal Trade Commission, 1997). But
tax changes explain only about 80% of the within state-year variation in prices, so that there
is remaining variation in the price that could lead to endogeneity bias in the price-consumption
relationship. The true exogenous variation that should be used to identify this model is taxes.
However, as column (4) of Table 1 shows, the results are weakened considerably when taxes are
used in place of prices in the reduced form specification; the future tax term is significant only
at the 10% level. Indeed, when we restrict the analysis to the 1955-85 period used by BGM, the
coefficient on future taxes is positive.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, this test is unable to distinguish true future price effects
from other failures of the fixed effects specification. It is plausible that over such a long time period
state effects are not truly fixed. If, for any reason, prices or taxes are slowly rising over time in
the states where smoking is falling the most, then this will lead to a finding that future prices are
correlated with current consumption. Indeed, in many other applications, the fact that the lead of a
price variable affects current behavior is taken as the failure of a specification test of the model, not
as evidence of forward looking behavior.6. This relationship between price and lagged consumption
is consistent with Showalter [32], who documents that an oligopolistic tobacco manufacturer facing
a relatively inelastic demand for cigarettes will react to declining consumption by raising price. The
same behavior may be true of revenue-maximizing state governments faced with declining cigarette
demand, leading to the observed correlation even with taxes.
While this alternative cannot cleanly be distinguished, two simple tests can demonstrate the
fragility of the BGM findings to particular specifications of the alternative model. The first is
to allow for additional flexibility in the specification by including state-specific time trends. This
will control for any slowly moving correlated trends within states in the tastes for smoking and
The elasticities presented for the tax coefficients are price elasticities, which are evaluated by first estimating
models of price as a function of tax, and using the resulting coefficients to estimate pass-through; the coefficients
imply pass-through of taxes to prices of 108 to 116%, depending on the specification
6Fora discussion of identification issues in a panel data context, see Chamberlain [11].
6tax/pricing policy. An alternative test is to move from a fixed effects to a changes specification. If
state fixed effects are indeed fixed, then these two alternatives should yield identical answers.But,
if there is are dependencies of prices on past consumption, then changes can yieldvery different
answers. Neither of these tests is particularly strong, in that they cannot distinguish year-year
reverse causality from adjacent complementarity, but they provide reasonable starting points for
examining specification fragility. Indeed, a changes specification of the relationship seems a more
natural one for testing for adjacent complementarity: it asks whether when prices rise from this
year to the next, consumption falls this year.
As we see in the remaining columns of Table 1, however, when we move from a fixed effects
specification to either a fixed trends or changes specification, the results for the lead of prices or taxes
are greatly weakened. The future price coefficient drops below its standard error, and the future
tax coefficient actually becomes positive and, in the last column, statistically significant. These
changes are not driven by decreased precision; both the fixed trends and changes specification
actually produce smaller standard errors on the lead price/tax term than does the fixed effects
specification. Moreover, the coefficient on the contemporaneous price/tax term itself is robust to
these alternative specifications, so that the basic demand relationship is not sensitive to functional
form.
Overall, the structure of the existing tests of adjacent complementarity appears problematic
along a number of dimensions. We next present a test that is designed to remedy these deficiencies,
in several ways. First, will rely only on tax increases that have already been announced toidentify
our anticipatory effect. Second, we will use data on actual cigarette consumption, rather than sales.
Third, we will use information on tax changes, not price changes. Finally, we will examinevery
high frequency changes which are unlikely to suffer from the type of bias that hinders testing for
forward looking behavior in annual data; we present tests below to demonstrate thevalidity of this
claim.
73 A New Test of Forward Looking Behavior-EmpiricalStrategy
Data
We propose an alternative test of forward looking behavior that is consistentin spirit with the
test employed by BGM, but improves on the problems noted above. Inparticular, we have collected
from state legislative histories since 1973 the date of the legislativeenactment of state excise tax
increases, and the date that they were actually effective. By examining cigaretteconsumption
in the intervening period, we can test for forward looking behavior. Ifindividuals are forward
looking, but cannot forecast taxes beyond already announced tax increases, then thisprovides a
more appropriate framework for examining adjacent complementarity.
We summarize the information on these tax changes in Table2, which shows the period of time
between the enactment and effective dates of state excise tax increases. Overthe full 1973-1996
period, 36 tax changes were enacted and effective in the same month, and 44 in consecutivemonths.
Yet 68 tax changes had at least one month between the enactment and effectivedates. The longest
gap between enactment and effective dates was 7 months.
In addition, there were a number of examples of multiple tax increasesthat were enacted on
the same date. The first such change is included in the first 8rows of the table. The last two rows
show that there were 12 second or third changes from suchmultiple change examples, and that 8
of them were effective more than oneyear after being enacted. In the empirical work below, we
only use the first effective date for such changes.
We have collected two sources of data on cigaretteconsumption to test for anticipatory re-
sponses. The first is the monthly series of tax-paid cigarette sales that underlies the annual data
used by BGM and others (as well as in the regressions in Table1). This was constructed using data
from state excise tax collections, as archived at the Tobacco Instituteand the North Carolina State
University. As with the annual data, these represent withdrawals from wholesaledistributors, since
this is the point at which the excise tax is paid. We have collectedthese data from January 1982
through December 1996, with the exception of September and October1982, for which data were
not available. As noted above, however, and as will be documentedfurther below, it is problematic
to use data on cigarette sales to test for anticipatoryprice responses of consumption.
8At the same time, data on cigarette consumption for this purpose must meet a difficult criterion,
as they must provide state by month observations of enough size so as to form reasonable proxies
for cigarette consumption. Fortunately, there is a dataset which meets this condition: the Vital
Statistics Natality Data. Since 1989, this database has recorded, for every birth in America, whether
the mother smokes and how much, as well as the state of residence of the mother. As a result,
there are roughly 4 million observations per year on smoking behavior, providing sufficient sample
size to measure state by month smoking rates; in our final database, the typical state month cell
has 5320 observations. This is clearly not a representative population, but it is a population of
particular interest, since maternal smoking and poor subsequent infant health is perhaps the leading
externality associated with smoking behavior (Evans, Ringel, and Stech [14]).
We use the full set of 1989-1996 Natality files to measure monthly smoking rates for every
state for which the smoking information was collected '.Thekey question of interest asks women
about smoking during pregnancy; we assume that these women are answering with reference to the
month of birth. To the extent that they are answering with reference to smoking anytime during
pregnancy, we will understate the responsiveness to future increases.
Our dependent variable is the number of cigarettes smoked each day per woman in each
state/month cell, which is formed by dividing total cigarettes smoked per day among smoking
women by the total number of women in the cell. As Table 3 shows, the weighted (by number of
births in a cell) mean of this variable over the 1989-96 period is slightly less than 2. This implies
that per capita monthly consumption of (20 cigarette) packs of cigarettes is about 3. Thiscompares
to per capital annual packs of cigarettes sold, from our monthly sales data, of 9. The fact that
this figure is lower is not surprising, as the women in this sample are less likely to smoke than the
typical person, and they smoke less intensively when they do smoke. Overall, as we show in Table
3, the smoking rate for our sample of women is 16.2%, and those who smoke consume on average
only about two-thirds of a pack per day. Averaging over all smokers over age 18 for 1989-1996,
using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data, the average smoking rate is
23%, and the average cigarettes smoked per day per smoker is 18.7.
Smoking data are not available for California, Indiana, and South Dakota in any year; for New York for 1989-93;
for Oklahoma for 1989-90; and for Louisiana and Nebraska for 1989.
9One concern with these data is that mothers may underreport smoking whilepregnant. While
we cannot definitively address this concern, it is noticeable that the smoking participation rate in
these data is almost exactly the same as that from a National Health Interview Surveysupplement
in 1991 which provides a retrospective survey of women on their smoking while pregnant.8. So there
doesn't appear to be any systematic underreporting on birth certificates relative to othersurveys.
Moreover, underreporting would not lead to a systematic bias to the estimates unless it is somehow
correlated with price changes, which seems unlikely.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy follows that described with reference to Table 1 forexamining the impact
of current and future prices. We run regressions of the form:
SMOKsm+f3*EFFECTsm+7*ENACT+8*M+cb*S+i (1)
where SMOK is the measure of smoking in state s in monthm; EFFECT is the effective tax rate
in that state and month; ENACT is the enacted tax rate in that state andmonth; and M and
S are full sets of month (we include dummies for each calendar month inour sample period) and
state dummies, respectively. ENACT is the same as EFFECT except when a change has been
enacted and not yet effective, so this is our future price variable. For these regressionswe exclude
both the months in which tax changes are enacted and they are effective, since both of theseevents
can happen at any time during the month, so that the response in that monthmay be quite muted.
In some specifications, we also include a lagged value of the effectiverate; we use a twice lagged
tax rate, since we are excluding the month of the tax change. All natality dataregressions are
weighted by the size of the cell to reflect sampling variability in our aggregation strategy.
Note that we use everywhere taxes, and not prices, to test for forward lookingbehavior, because
price data is not available on such a high frequency basis by state. A legitimate question is
then whether a finding of anticipatory behavior reflects anticipation byconsumers or producers; if
cigarette prices in a state are increased in anticipation of tax changes, then demandmay be falling
through the standard law of demand. This issue is raised by Showalter [32], who findsno evidence
of anticipatory pricing at an annual frequency.
The NHIS supplement data indicate that 20.6% of women smoked at some timeduring their pregnancy, and
16.6% smoked throughout the pregnancy. The fant that the latter figure so closely matchesour data provides further
suggestive evidence that women are responding to this question with reference to the month of birth.
10While monthly data on cigarette prices are not available, there is quarterly data from the
American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) on prices for selected cities of
a carton of Winston cigarettes [27]. We have used these data to investigate anticipatory pricing
for tax changes where the announcement of the price increase is in a different quarter then the
implementation. We found no evidence of sizeable price increases before the tax was actually
implemented. For example, the state of Alaska enacted a 70 cent tax increase at the end of May,
1997, which was to be implemented in October. Yet the price of cigarettes rose by only 4 cents in
the third quarter before rising by 88 cents in the fourth. Similarly, Michigan at the end of 1993
enacted a 50 cent tax increase which was to be implemented in May. There was only a 5 centper
pack price increase from the end of 1993 through the second quarter of 1994, and then a 50 cent
increase in the third quarter. These findings suggest that producers are not increasing prices in
anticipation of excise tax increases. This supposition is confirmed below by the fact that we find
sales dramatically increasing in anticipation of tax increases, which would not occur if prices had
already risen.
A key assumption of our alternative strategy is that over thevery high frequency changes
that we are observing, state fixed effects can indeed be taken as fixed. That is, whatever is
causing the long run correlation between consumption and taxes in the BGM-type specifications
will not bias our estimates of the impact of tax increases in the next several monthson this
month's consumption. This assumption strikes us as reasonable, since state excise tax decisions
seem unlikely to be responding to smoking rates in the very recent past, and since we are using a
much shorter time frame over which the constant state fixed effects assumption is to be imposed.
But we will nevertheless subject our finding to the same set of tests that we applied to the BGM
results to demonstrate that it is robust.
4 A New Test -Results
The results of using these two data sources to examine the impact of future tax increasesare
presented in Table 4. We begin with the packs/capita aggregate sales data. We find from this
11data a strong negative effect of the current effective tax rate, with a price elasticity of -0.8 .This
elasticity is somewhat higher than that estimated at an annual frequency in Table 1, and is much
higher than that found by BGM. The difference appears to arise from the fact that the tax-induced
movement in prices causes larger consumption declines than does the price-induced movement in
prices.
In the next row, we include the future tax change term, as well as lagged effective taxes. In
fact, the coefficient on the announced rate is actually positive and highly significant. At a monthly
frequency, such a positive reaction to future price increases is sensible, as consumers hoard cigarettes
at lower prices for future use. This hoarding effect is consistent with the evidence in Keeler et al.
(1993), who find cigarette sales rising in the months before a 1989 excise tax increase in California.
Indeed, we see this response in our data, for the large increase in the excise tax from 10 to 35 cents
in California that was announced in November 1988 and effective in January 1989. In November,
cigarette sales were just slightly down from what they had been the previous November, at 6.68
packs per capita. Then, in December, sales jumped to 8.71 packs per capita, before falling back to
around 6 over the next few months.
This sizeable hoarding effect could be taken as one type of forward looking behavior by con-
sumers, in that they are stocking up in anticipation of a tax increase. It is not clear how much
of the hoarding effect we find is due to consumer vs. retailer behavior, as some state excise tax
increases exempt floorstocks held by retailers when the tax changes. For a sample of the 12 largest
tax changes in recent years, we found in the legislation or through contact with state taxation
officials that in 10 of 12 cases floorstocks were included, so that any hoarding effect would be due
to consumers. In either case, this sizeable hoarding effect casts doubt on the usefulness of sales
data for testing for anticipatory consumption behavior.
We also find that including the enacted and lagged rate significantly increases the term on
the current price, which now implies an elasticity of -1.5, with a sizeable and significant positive
elasticity on the lag as well as the lead. The positive impact of the lagged rate, and the large value
The magnitudes of these coefficients differ from those in Table 1 for three reasons: we deflate taxes by $1982
here, rather than the $1967 used in Table 1 (which lowers the coefficients by a factor of 0.334); we are using monthly
data here, rather than annual data (which lowers the coefficients by a factor of 12); and we use the tax rate in
dollars, rather than cents (which raises the coefficients by a factor of 100). But the elasticities are of course directly
comparable. Once again, we use the coefficients from the regressions in the aggregate annual data of price on taxes
to interpret these tax effects as price elasticities.
12of the current tax rate, no doubt reflects monthly timing of purchases in our data: if individuals
are hoarding in the months before a tax change, then sales will fall most sharply in the month of
the change, before rising again somewhat thereafter. This is what we see in the second column of
Table 4: a rise in sales in the months before a change, a sharp decline in the month of thechange,
and then an offsetting increase thereafter.
The next two columns of Table 4 consider the impact of effective and enacted taxes inour
natality data. Here, when we just include the effective tax rate term, we find a much smaller
impact of taxes, with a price elasticity of just -0.35. This is consistent with the notion that women
who are still smoking at the time that they are giving birth may be less sensitive to economic factors
such as prices. Nevertheless, the coefficient is highly significant, so that if there is an anticipatory
response we should be able to estimate it with this data.
When we include the enacted tax rate as well in the next row of Table 4, the coefficienton the
enacted rate is in fact negative and significant. Thus, using this more refined test, we findstrong
evidence of forward looking behavior, for this population at least. Including the enacted and lagged
rate leads in this case to a sizeable fall in the current tax coefficient, with a relatively sizeable (but
insignificant) lag term. Thus, the results indicate that the response to a tax next period is equal
to the current plus lagged response to a current tax.
One might be tempted to infer something about the degree of rationality from these relative
coefficients. Indeed, BGM do some calculations which infer the discount rate bydividing the
coefficient on future and lagged consumption. But in fact this is only technically true underone of
two conditions: either if the price changes are temporary, which is only true (in an announcedsense)
for one tax change in our full sample over this period, or the stock ofpast smoking depreciates fully
in one period (since this makes prices further away irrelevant for today'ssmoking decision). We
prove this in appendix B.2. We discuss below the issues involved in using these types of estimates
to infer behavioral parameters.
Specification Testing
It is of course important to subject our estimates to the same scrutiny to whichwe subjected
the BGM results. Table 5 therefore includes fixed trends in our model. For the salesdata, doing so
lowers the impact of current effective rates, with an implied elasticity of -0.62 from the first column
13of Table 5. This is very similar to the fixed trends tax elasticity found in Table 1 from the annual
sales data. Once again, we find that when the enacted and lagged tax rates are entered, the current
tax effect rises, and the enacted and lagged tax rates are both significant and positive.
For the natality data, the results are also similar when fixed trends are added. We find that the
impact of the effective tax rate when entered alone (the third column of Table 5) is weakened, with
an elasticity now of -0.27. And we once again find that there is a significant negative impact of
enacted but not yet effective taxes; the effect is roughly 80% as large as in the fixed effects model.
We find here as well that there is virtually no instantaneous impact of effective tax changes on
consumption, with most of the effect showing up with a lag. Once again, the current plus lagged
effective tax coefficients are roughly equal to the enacted tax coefficient. Thus, unlike the earlier
results from BGM (and presumably from other tests using annual data), our findings are relatively
robust to the inclusion of fixed trends.
We have also considered differenced models. Here, we cannot simply difference our monthly
panel, since it would imply that for tax changes with several months between enactment and
effective, the difference in the enacted rate would be zero after the first month. As we discuss
below, we do not have sufficient power in our data to estimate month-by-month responses of tax
enactment. Therefore, we have pursued an alternative approach of taking the average smoking level
over all months between the enactment and effective dates, and taking the difference between this
average and the smoking level in the month before the tax change was enacted. We also include
in these differenced regressions, as controls, any months where there were no tax changes enacted
in that month or in the two months before; we then take the difference between smoking in that
month and smoking two months earlier as a control observation. Our true enactment differences
are matched to the change in the enacted rate (the change from the old effective rate to the new
enacted rate), and our control observations are matched to a tax change of zero. The regression
includes a full set of month dummies.
The results of this exercise, for both packs per capita and cigarette consumption from the
natality data, are presented in the final row of Table 5. We find very similar results to the fixed
trends specification, albeit with slightly larger standard errors.
One additional concern with our finding is that it reflects not anticipatoryresponses to future
14price changes, but rather changes in reporting in the wake of announced tax increases. Thatis,
it is possible that when future price increases are announced,women become more exposed to
anti- smoking sentiment and are thus less likely to report that they smoke. While thisconcern
is impossible to address precisely, we have investigated it in two casualways. First, for the two
announced increases in Massachusetts in 1992 and 1996, both of which hadroughly two months
between the enacted and effective dates, we examined the majornewspapers in the Boston area for
any evidence of increased anti-smoking counteradvertising. We found no such advertising in the
intervening months.
Second, for the differenced models presented in Table 5 that consider how smoking changes
when a tax rate is announced, we have included along with the differenced tax ratea dummy for
the presence of a tax change. If it is the announcement of the taxchange per se that matters, and
not the price change, then the inclusion of this dummy should significantly weakenour differences
relationship. In fact, however, there is no impact on our coefficient when the dummy is included
(although the standard error does rise by about 50%), and the dummy itself is not significant. This
test is not definitive, of course, because anti-smoking rhetoric could beproportional to the size of
the tax change. But it certainly suggests that it is not thepresence of a tax change per se, but
rather the future rise in price, that is causing women to reduce theirsmoking.
Thus, to summarize, we have provided a more robust framework for testing foranticipatory
responses by consumers to future changes in the taxation of cigarettes. Even in this more robust
framework, we continue to find evidence of adjacent complementarity. This doesnot, however,
necessarily provide support for Becker and Murphy's formulation of the smoking decision,as we
document in the remainder of the paper.
5 The frame of the models
The term "rational addiction" obscures the fact that the Becker andMurphy model imposes two
assumptions on consumer behavior. The first is that of forward-lookingdecision-making, which
is hard to impugn and which will be a key feature ofour alternative models as well. But the
second is the assumption that consumers are time consistent.Psychological evidence documents
15overwhelmingly that consumers are time inconsistent [1]. In experimental settings, consumers
consistently reveal a lower discount rate when making decisions over time intervals further away
than for ones closer to the present, raising the specter of intra-personal conflict over decisions
that have implications for the future. There is, to date, little non-experimental evidence for time-
inconsistency in decisionmaking. But it is important to note that there is no evidence, psychological
or other, that supports time-consistent preferences over these time inconsistent ones.
The above type of time inconsistency has been recently applied in the context of savings decisions
(Laibson [19], Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman [20], O'Donoghue and Rabin [26]), retirement
decisions (Diamond and Köszegi [13]), and even growth (Barro [2]). Since smoking is a short-term
pleasure, and the psychological evidence indicates that time inconsistency is most prevalent with
short horizons, this formulation should be especially fruitful in the context of addictive bads such
as smoking.
There is also indirect evidence that people's preferences for smoking are time-inconsistent.
Two key features distinguish time consistent and time inconsistent agents. The first is the use
of commitment devices or self-control techniques. We distinguish a self-control device from an
alternative technology for smoking cessation, quitting aids: whereas quitting aids decrease the
disutility from not smoking, self-control devices lower the utility from smoking. Time-consistent
decisionmakers might use a quitting aid, but in general they won't use a self-control device—with
time consistency, lowering the utility of an undesired alternative is irrelevant for decisionmaking.
But for some types of time inconsistent agents (what we label below sophisticatedagents, who
recognize their own time inconsistency), self-control devices are valued as a means of combating
one's own time inconsistent tendencies.
In the relatively small medical literature on self-initiated attempts at quitting smoking, the
voluntary use of self-control devices figures prominently. People regularly set up socially managed
incentives to refrain from smoking by betting with others, telling them about the decision, and
otherwise making it embarrassing to smoke (Prochaska et al [31]). Various punishment and self-
control strategies for quitting are also widely studied in controlled experiments on smoking cessation
(Miller [22], Murray and Hobbs [23]; see Bernstein [5] for a variety of 'aversive stimulus' techniques),
and they are recommended by both academic publications [15] and self-help books[8]. In one study,
16for example, subjects tore up a dollar bill for every cigarette they smoked above their given daily
limit, and reduced that limit gradually. Presumably, these experiments are incorporating self-
control devices because they are seen as the best option for helping individuals quit smoking, as
could be the case if individuals were time inconsistent.
A second feature that distinguishes time consistent agents from time inconsistent agents is
an inability to actualize predicted or desired future levels of smoking. The former phenomenon
is specific to a class of hyperbolic discounters whom we label naive below, in that they do not
understand that they cannot make consistent plans through time. In fact, unrealized intentions to
quit at some future date are a common feature of stated smoker preferences. According to Burns
[6], eight of ten smokers in America express a desire to quit their habit. Unfortunately, these desires
can be interpreted in a number of ways, and we are not aware of any evidence for adults on their
specific predictions or intentions about future smoking behavior. For youths, however, there is
clear evidence that they underestimate the future likelihood of smoking. For example, among high
school seniors who smoke, 56% say that they won't be smoking 5 years later, but only 31% of them
have in fact quit five years hence. Moreover, among those who smoke more than 1 pack/day, the
smoking rate five years later among those who stated that they would be smoking (72%) is actually
lower than the smoking rate among those who stated that they would not be smoking (74%) [28].
Less forceful, but still suggestive, evidence for naive time inconsistency comes from attempted
quits. According to Harris [17], 38 of the 46 million smokers in America in 1993 have tried to stop
at one point or another, with an average smoker trying to quit once every eight and a half months.
Most have tried several times. 54% of serious attempts at quitting fail within one week. These
facts do not necessarily contradict a time consistent model which incorporates learning and/or
uncertainty, since smokers might experiment with quitting to find out how hard it is or simply
'gamble' in the hope of stumbling on an instance when it's easy. But it seems implausible that
smokers learn so slowly or that the situations in which they try quitting are so variable.
Our goal in this section is therefore to take the important insights about forward looking
behavior captured in the Becker and Murphy model, and to integrate them with a potentially
more realistic description of intertemporal choice in this context. The crucial question we are
dealing with is the shape of time discounting. Suppose we are in a T-period decision model. For a
17time-consistent agent, discounted utility at time t takes the familiar form
T—t
(2)
where the U2 denote the instantaneous utilities. We will contrast thistype of discounting with
the alternative developed by Laibson [19], quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Forquasi-hyperbolic dis-
counters, discounted utility becomes
T-t
Ut+/3>8U,. (3)
/3 and 8 are usually assumed to be between zero and one. The extra discountparameter /3 is
intended to capture the essence of hyperbolic discounting, namely, that the discount factor between
consecutive future periods (6) is larger than between the current period and the nextone (/38). At
the same time, this formulation still allows one to take advantage ofsome of the analytical simplicity
of the time-consistent model. For a more thorough introduction,see Laibson [19].
Our model marries this intertemporal preference structure with the instantaneouspreferences
in Becker and Murphy's rational addiction model [3]. We deviate from both Becker andMurphy
and Laibson, however, by assuming no savings—some exogenouslygiven income is consumed in
each period. The main motivation behind this simplification is to make thesophisticated model
tractable. Otherwise, we have to keep track of two state variables (the stock ofpast smoking and
wealth) which evolve differently, and the Euler equation will be considerably morecomplicated.
Although the interaction of savings and addictive behavior is potentiallyvery interesting 10, we
are primarily interested in isolating the effect of self-control problems for just the addictivegood,
which are unlikely to change significantly with the incorporation ofa savings decision. In addition,
low savings among the low income population that is most likely to smoke rendersthis assumption
relatively innocuous11.
Let at and Ct denote, respectively, the consumption of the addictive and the'ordinary' (non-
addictive) goods in period t. Both can take any value on the real line. Furthermore,we denote the
We did solve for the Euler equations with saving, and there are someinteresting effects that drop out easily. For
example, if wealth makes a person more prone to addiction, she might want to overconsume (consumemore than she
otherwise would) so as to prevent addiction. Or, if smoking is a substitute for other kinds ofconsumption, the agent
might choose to get addicted on purpose to alleviate her self-control problem in savings. This is thesame effect that
drives individuals to smoke to lose weight.
Of course, there are many addictive goods (cocaine, fine wine,collecting art, etc.) which are very expensive.
The no-saving assumption makes our model less applicable to thesegoods.
18period t stock of past consumption by S. St evolves according to
Sti =(1—d)(S+ at). (4)
d is the depreciation rate of the stock; the higher is d, the less does past behavior influence the stock
of accumulated consumption, and thus, indirectly, utility. For notational and arithmetic simplicity,
this differs from Becker and Murphy [3], who have=(1—d)S+ at. As long as depreciation is
not full (d <1),their model and our time-consistent case are isomorphic through a simple change
of variables.
We assume, as in Becker and Murphy [3], that instantaneous utility is additively separable in
these two goods, that is,
Ut =U(at,ct,St)=v(at,St)+U(Ct). (5)
Vas (at, S) is positive, because consumption of addictive goods generally increases their future
marginal utility. Let It be period t income and Pt the period t price. We normalize the price
of the non-addictive good to be 1.
We consider both agents who discount exponentially (equation 2) and who discount quasi-
hyperbolically (equation 3). We will distinguish between two extreme kinds of hyperbolic discounter
agents. Naive agents, although they are impatient in the sense that they attach extra value to the
current period relative to the future ones, are unaware of their future self-control problem: self t
doesn't realize that self t + 1 will in turn overvalue period t + 1. Thus a naive agent maximizes her
intertemporal utility in expression 3, unconscious of the fact that her future selves will change her
plans. Sophisticated agents, on the other hand, realize their self-control problem: self t knows that
self t + 1 will want to do something other than what self t would have her do. Therefore the best
thing self t can achieve is to make a plan that she will actually follow. Formally, this is modeled as
a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a game played by the successive intertemporal selves, the action
spaces in our case being the vectors of consumption (at, Ct). See O'Donoghue and Rabin [25] for
an excellent discussion of sophistication and naiveté, as well for a few basic behavioral contrasts
between the two.
195.1 Time-consistentagents
Standard methods reveal the following Euler-equation for time-consistent agents. The most natural
way to think about it is that a small perturbation in consumption in period t that is undone in
period t +1 doesn't change utility. In contrast to a simple savings problem, however, we also have a
vs(at+1, s+1)termin the Euler equation, because a change in St+iaffectsutility directly, whereas
in a savings problem wealth does not.
Lemma 1 Suppose U(ct) and v(at, S) are differentiable. Then, for a time-consistent agent the
following Euler-equation holds:
va(at,St)—ptu'(ct) =(1—d)8[va(at+i,St+i) —pt+lu'(ct+l) —vs(at+i,St+i)J (6)
5.2 Naive agents
Naifs solve a verysimilarmaximization problem to time-consistent agents, theonly difference being
anextra discount factor /3between periods t andt+ 1.
Lemma 2 Supposeu(Ct)and v(at, S) are differentiable. Then, for naive agents, period t con-
sumption of the addictive and ordinary goods satisfies
va(at,St)—ptu'(ct) =(1—d)/36[va(a9,St+i) —pt+1u'(c) —v8(a,Sj1),] (7)
where aandcjdenote the amounts the agent is planning to consume in period t + 1, or,the
amountsa time-consistent agent would consume in that period.
5.3 Sophisticated agents
Now we move on to the more difficult problem, the problem for sophisticated agents.
Lemma 3 Suppose n(ct) and v(at, S) are differentiable and that a Markov-perfect subgame-perfect
equilibrium with differentiable strategy profiles exists. Then, for each t E {O,...,T—1}we have
va(at,St)—ptu'(ct) =




20The proof is in appendix A.
It is worth investigating the sophisticates' first-order condition a little bit further. Rewrite it
in the following way:
va(at,St)—ptu'(ct) =(1—d)135[va(a,Sj+i) —pt+iu'(c?) —vs(a,St+i)1
+(1—d)[(v8(a,St+i) —(vs(at+i,St+i))]
pessimismeffect
+(1— d)138[(va(at+i,St+i) pt+1u'(ct+i)) —((va(a,S+i) —pt÷1u'(c))]
pessimismeffect





+ (1 —d)5[(1 —/3)(va(at+i,St+i) —pt+vu'(ct+i)J (9)
damage control effect
This formulation allows us to characterize the effects that determine whether sophisticates
consume more or less than naifs. The first term on the right-hand side of equation 9 is just the
right-hand side of equation 7, so the sign of the rest of the expression determines the relative
consumption of sophisticates and naifs.
The first two terms are named the 'pessimism effect'. Assuming thatat+1 >a,that is,
that actual consumption of the addictive good is higher than the desired consumption, this term
is clearly negative, tending to raise period t consumption relative to that of naifs. This occurs due
to the complementarity of consumptions in periods t and t + 1. In short, the realistic prognosis of
sophisticated agents leads them to be pessimistic about future selves' consumption, and sinceat
and at+1 are complements, this tends to raise their consumption.
The other two effects operate through self t's knowledge that she can influence later selves by
leaving different amounts of stock. One way this can help is by influencing later selves directly;
this is the 'incentive effect,' the third term in the above equation. From self t's point ofview, self
t + 1 consumes too much, not maximizing self t's discounted utility. Thus a reduction inat+1 leads
to a first-order increase in self t's utility from period t + 1 on. But self t can give an incentive for
self t + 1 to consume less through leaving a lower S1 12Thistends to lower the consumption of
12 Assuming, ofcourse, that jL±J > 0, which should be the case for the good to be appropriately called addictive.
We will see below exactly when this condition holds. Also, we are interested in harmful addictions, whichimplies
va(at+i, St÷i) —pt+lu'(et+l)> 0 in all periods other than the last one. See section 6.
21sophisticates relative to naifs—naifs think it unnecessary to provide incentives for future selves, as
they believe those selves will do the right thing anyway.
We label the last effect, which also tends to lower sophisticates' consumption relative to naifs',
'damage control.' It is a somewhat subtle effect, and the easiest way to understand it is to assume
=0,so that there is no incentive effect. However, how badly future selves conduct themselves
in the eyes of self t depends not only on what they do, but also on what they should do. That is, if
future selves' self-control problem becomes smaller, they make better decisions in the eyes of self t.
And this is exactly what is going on here: as we lower futureself-control problems decrease,
lowering the damage later selves do to self t. Thus the term 'damage control'.
These effects might be confusing to distinguish only because they operate on the same space
of actions—consumption of at. However, that they are conceptually different becomes evident when
we have more instruments. Imagine that you have to decide tomorrow whether to play basketball
or write your paper. From today's point of view, it is optimal to write the paper, but you know
that tomorrow's self won't want to do it. You can do a number of things. First, you can try to
set up incentives for tomorrow to write the paper; for example, by making sure you'll have no one
to play with. This is the incentive effect. Second, if you think that might not work, you might
want to practice your jump shot to at least enjoy the game that you'll inevitably play. This is the
equivalent of the pessimism effect. And finally, if you know the commitment won't work, you could
assure the outcome won't be so bad, for example by starting your paper today—the damage control
effect. A number of hyperbolic discounting models where there is a state variable involved can be
understood in these terms (Diamond and Kôszegi [13], Laibson [19]).
The pessimism and incentive effects have been identified by O'Donoghue and Rabin [24] in a
related formulation of the consumption decision for addictive goods. In contrast toours, their
setup allows for two consumption choices, hit or not hit; the level of addiction, in turn, can also
take on two values: hooked or not hooked, and the agent is hooked if she hit last period. This
discreteness assumption generates important differences from our model. As we note below, if the
discrete model is extended to include prices, its implications for certain price changes are different
from the continuous model we are adapting (and from the empirical evidence we obtain). This
feature also makes it a difficult model to use for the optimal tax analysis that we undertake in the
22final section of the paper 13
6 Solving the models
Following Becker and Murphy [3], we take v(aj, S) and u(ct) to be quadratic:
aaa 2 cr88 2 v(at,St) =aaat+cx3St+—---at +oasatSt + —i--St (10)
u(Ct) =act+ ct2, (11)
where aa,aas, and a are positive and as,aaa,ass, and a are negative. The key parameter is
aas, which measures the effect of past consumption on the marginal utility of current consumption.
aas > 0 means if you had done more drugs in the past, you will crave them more in the present.
This is what can give rise to addictive behavior. The physiological evidence that aas is positive
for many goods is overwhelming. For most of this paper, we will take U(at, Ct, S) to be strictly
concave, that is, we suppose its Hessian is negative definite.
In this case, for all three models it is very easy to prove by backward induction that at is linear
in S, that is, at =)'.S+ itt, where and 1t are constants. The following theorem helps establish
that for a general class of parameter values, marginal propensities to addiction are stationary for
all three types far from the end of the horizon.
Theorem 1 Suppose /3 ￿ and that U(at, Ct, S) is strictly concave. Then, lim,0 AT_3 =
whereA*s is given as the unique solution on the interval (—1, of
——1+
as —aaP2Qcc —
—aaa—P2acc + 6(1 —d)2[(1+ (1— /3).X*8)(aaaA*3+aas +p2accA*3) —I3aasA*s — /3a3]
_____________________________________
(12)
13Ourmodel also hasparallelswith another recent paper (Orphanides and Zervos [30]) which examines the role of
information in rational addiction. If the addictiveness of a good for the individual is unknown, it might be optimal
(even in a rational time-consistent setting) to risk getting addicted. If it turns out the good is addictive, the agent's
ex-ante decision looks suboptimal when viewed through the lens of ex-post information, leading to ex-post regret. In
this model, addiction-prone individuals who think they will not get addicted are most likely to do so.
Naive hyperbolic discounters also have an informational problem that influences their consumption decisions: they
are overoptimistic about their future self-control problem. Descriptively, this sounds like the Orphanides and Zervos
[30] effect, but there are two major differences. First, naifs' misperception problem is not about the addictiveness
of the good—they are perfectly clear on how consumption in one period affects utility later. Rather, they don't
understand how this intertemporal complementarity will play out in their future behavior. This is a much more
general informational problem that carries across contexts. Second, it's not merely overoptimism that leads naifs to
consume too much—we've seen that sophisticates, who are realistic about their self-control problems, also consume
too much, maybe even more than naifs.
23Furthermore,> 0 (that is, there is adjacent complementarity) if and only if
/35(1 —d)2 cras >1—5(1 _d)2(as. (13)
The proof is technical and left to the appendix.
Notice that one of the assumptions of the theorem is /3 ￿ .Ifthis is not the case, it seems
possible (though we conjecture it won't usually be the case) that the agent exhibits wild cyclical
behavior characterized by periodic binges and brutal cuts. However, most of the psychological
literature points to a /3 above one-half, at least for the time period we consider most relevant for
time inconsistency in smoking decisions, a few weeks or few months. For small rewards, a weekly
discount rate of 10 to 30 percent seems reasonable (Kirby and Herrnstein [18]); this implies that
/3 is at least 0.7 (and even higher if S is less than one over this period as well). Thaler [34] finds
monthly discounts rates on the order of 20 to 30 percent, and three-monthly discount rates of up
to 50 percent. The evidence reviewed by Ainslie [1] indicates that yearly discount rates are about
40 percent, and /3 =0.6is the estimate used by Laibson [19].
Setting j3 =1in the above expression gives the implicit expression for the marginal propensity
to respond to the stock for time-consistent agents, A*TC. And the naifs' first-order condition 7 can
then be used to show that
2 — 1+ as —aaa—
14 ——
— P2cc+ /38(1 —d)2[aaaA*TC+ O + —crasA*TG'—]•
Theorem2 A* > A8 ￿ A*TC
Once again, the proof is left to the appendix.
This theorem states that a given increase in the stock of past consumption increases today's
consumption most for naifs, least for time-consistent agents, and somewhere in-between for sophis-
ticates.
It is not surprising that )', A*S￿A*TC: for large S it is bad to leave a higher stock, and neither
naifs nor sophisticates take this sufficiently into account, consuming more than time-consistent
agents with the same long-run preferences.
However, the fact that )' ASShaspotentially interesting and broad implications. Since S
is a 'bad' (it measures the level of addiction), in a very loose sense this result is saying that the
24worse their situation gets, the worse naifs do relative to sophisticates. Naifs, in a sense, believe
even when they are very hooked that things are not so bad, since their future self will just do
things right. Thus, they are enslaved to their current craving, with no controls. On the other hand,
sophisticates' knowledge that things arebadput a restraint on their craving.
7 Implications of price changes
For this section, we will assume that a =0,thereby eliminating income effects, which are probably
very small for small price changes in many addictive goods. We also assume constant income, It =I.
We will assume for much of what follows that all three models exhibit adjacent complementarity.
We want the problem to be well-behaved, that is, for PT—i to converge for all three types as j—*00,
sothat consumption rules are approximately stationary far from the end of the horizon. For naifs
and time-consistent agents, this is simple, and a precise proof is contained in appendix B.1.
For sophisticates, the incentive and damage control effects complicate the analysis. For small
3, the model can exhibit some 'violent' characteristics with respect to price changes. For example,
when the price increases permanently, the current self knows that this will act as a deterrent for
the future self, decreasing her need for incentives and damage control. This could lead her to
increase consumption drastically. Since a drastic increase in consumption in response to a current
price increase sounds implausible, we make sufficient assumptions in appendix B.1 to rule out this
possibility 14
Underthese conditions, it is easy to derive responses to different price changes for the three
types. We do so in appendix B. 1 and summarize some responses to permanent price increases in
table 7. From this table, it is clear that as long as the good is sufficiently addictive, all three types
respond to a future price increase by decreasing consumption. In particular, for all three types,
the knowledge (or expectation) that future selves will decrease their consumption decreases the
marginal utility of consumption today due to the complementarity of intertemporal consumption
levels (the 'make quitting easier' effect) 15Therefore,Becker, Grossman, and Murphy's [4] test
14Afterdoing this, there are still phenomena operating through the incentive effect that look more reasonable.
For example, the incentive effect might explain some yuppie binges: that before a big project or a new job, many
normally restrained people get wasted on alcohol or high on drugs, only because they know that their job is important
enough for them not to keep up with the habit permanently.
15Aneffect going the other way is the usual substitution effect: one wants to shift consumption toward times when
25cannot distinguish the rational addiction model from alternatives such as ours.
In principle, the price responses to changes at different points in the future can be used to back
out the parameters /3 and 8 using the formulas in table 7, thereby allowing us to assess the degree
of time inconsistency in smoking decisions. Moreover, a less ambitious test of time inconsistency
per se is also feasible. Operating under the null hypothesis of time consistency, we can back out d
and A*TC as described in appendix C. 1. Then, the ratio of the response to current price changes
and to those occuring in one period allows us to estimate 8. If in reality the agent is a hyperbolic
discounter, this method underestimates her long-term discount factor. The underestimation, in
turn, is revealed by comparing the responses to price changes two periods versus one period ahead,
since the former depends more on the long-term discount factor. This approach depends neither on
whether the agent is naive or sophisticated, nor really on the exact form of discounting she uses (as
long as it is hyperbolic). Section C of the appendix describes the above test precisely and proves
formally that the methodology actually works for both kinds of agents.
In practice, however, both of these tests have proved difficult to implement. The basic problem
is apparent from our discussion of differenced models: even grouping together all of the months
between enactment and effective dates, we obtain an estimate of the price response which is only
2.3 times its standard error. The result is that it is impossible to break down this period into the
smaller windows required to carry out these tests; the estimates for windows of different lengths
(e.g. price change in one vs. two periods ahead) are simply too imprecise to permit comparison to
each other. Future work with more precise data can perhaps implement these suggested tests to
assess the shape of discounting.
It is also worth noting that if the discrete model of O'Donoghue and Rabin [24] is extended
to include prices, it turns out that none of the types will ever quit in response to a future price
change. This is because quitting is a one-time decision (not a smooth decline in consumption as
in the continuous model), so that one might as well wait until the price change to quit—quitting
earlier wouldn't be any easier 16•
it'scheaper. For time-consistent agents, the former effect dominates if the good is addictive, )2'c>0. For both
types of quasi-hyperbolic discounters, one needs stronger addictivity for the former to dominate.
This complete lack of response to future price changes in the O'Donoghue and Rabin model is due to their
assumption of discreteness and full depreciation, d =1.If d =1is relaxed while retaining the discreteness of
consumption choices, the argument that it would be just as hard to quit today as tomorrow is invalidated. However,
268 Optimal government policy
A key implication of the rational addiction framework for modeling addiction is that government
regulatory policy towards addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities.
Just as the government has no cause, absent market failures, for interfering with revealed preference
in the realm of non-addictive goods, there is no reason to take addictiveness per se as a call to
government action, if individuals are pursuing these activities "rationally". It is this framework
that underlies the well known efforts of Manning et al. [21] and others to formulate optimal taxation
of cigarettes and alcohol as a function of the size of their external costs. These estimates, which
are frequently cited and influential in debates over excise taxation, suggest that the optimal tax
rate for cigarettes in particular is fairly low, since the net external costs of smoking are small.
But models with time-inconsistent agents extend the role of government policy by breaking
down revealed preference concepts of consumer choice. The argument that people act in their
best interests, so —barringwell-known qualifications —thegovernment should leave them alone,
is immediately invalidated in our setting. Therefore, though our models are explicitly of the no-
externality type'7, a benevolent social planner would want to intervene in this economy.
Of course, the question arises why we consider only government interventions to combat self-
control problems. If a sophisticated agent had access to an effective private self-control device, she
would take advantage of it, reducing the value of a government intervention. However, we find it
unlikely that fully effective self-control devices can be found in this context. Market-provided self-
control mechanisms are probably undercut by the market mechanism itself: although firms have a
financial incentive to provide self-control to agents, other firms have a financial incentive to break
it down. For example, if a firm developed a self-control shot that causes pain when the consumer
smokes, another firm has an incentive to develop a drug that relieves these effects for agents who
temporarily want to get rid of their commitment. Other problems arise in contracting setups. If
there are ex post gains to be made, the future self might want to renegotiate today's contract. But
it is not invalidated completely: old smokers, who have reached their steady-state level of stock, won't increase it any
more if they smoke today, so quitting tomorrow will be just as hard. Thus, there is an extra wrinkle relative to the
predictions of the continuous model: only new smokers (those who have taken up the habit recently) should respond
to future price changes.
At least in the inter-personal sense. One might look at the intra-personal conflicts that are generated by a
hyperbolic model as intra-personal externalities.
27even if there are none 18,thereis an ex post incentive to cheat on the contract: smoking is hard
to verify in court. This leaves us with privately provided self-control mechanisms like betting with
others or becoming involved in situations where it is very difficult to smoke, but these mechanisms
are likely to run into similar enforcement problems to those discussed above.
8.1 Setup
As in any model where different socially relevant actors have different tastes, a discussion of op-
timal government policy must start with the setup of the social welfare function. In the context
of hyperbolic discounting, these actors are not separate individuals, but different intertemporal in-
carnations of the same individual. The question of social welfare maximization in such a situation
has largely been ignored, so we face the difficult problem of specifying the social preferences to be
used for our purposes.
We will consider two approaches. In the first, we take the agent's long-run preferences as those
relevant for social welfare maximization. Clearly, if the representative agent were to vote in a tax
change today that is instituted starting tomorrow, these are the preferences she would use in choos-
ing the new tax rate. Alternatively, we can just maximize utility according to the preferences of the
self when the tax change is instituted, thus using a quasi-hyperbolically discounted welfare function.
The latter approach might seem odd in the hyperbolic context, since it completely disregards fu-
ture selves' preferences in the maximization. This 'dictatorship of the present,' however, is equally
unwarranted in the standard time-consistent framework (Caplin and Leahy [7]). Even there, there
is no compelling reason to think that different selves should have identical preferences over streams
of consumption Since'dictatorship of the present' is commonly assumed in economics, we will
consider it as well. In addition, if we make sufficient assumptions in the exponential model to
make 'dictatorship of the present' normatively appealing, the natural extension of the preferences
to hyperbolic discounting leads to an exponentially discounted welfare function, giving back our
18Forexample, the agent could post a bond, which she loses if she smokes.
19Evenif a lifetime of cigarette smoking is optimal from a 20-year-old's point of view, a 40-year-old might dislike
the resulting stock of past smoking, which is bad for her health. A social planner should take this into account. The
only case when the 20-year-old's preferences can in general be taken to be identical to the social optimum is when
the 40-year-old derives utility from past smoking (for example, through memory) and, moreover, discounts her own
utility just as the 20-year-old does.
28first approach 2OBothof these approaches lead to an optimal tax of zero in the limiting case of
=1,so our optimal tax is purely a 'self-control tax' (and, in the naive case, a misperception tax),
conceptually distinct from an 'intertemporal redistribution tax' that could be warranted by Caplin
and Leahy's arguments.
We first consider the case of a representative consumer with a very long life and a social planner
restricted to a tax on the addictive good that is invariant over time 21•Noticethat our assumption
of no income effects (c =0)guarantees that the social planner has no influence on A", but she can
essentially choose p' by setting the appropriate tax. Since in general A*s and A* are greater than
A*Tc, the government is restricted to a second-best policy. For each i =n,s, the social planner
solves
max [v(A*is + p, S) + cxc(It —p(A*iSt+ a))] (17)
s.t.S0, St+i(1 —d)(S+ A*i St + it)
Since the price p in the objective function is the pre-tax price, this formulation implicitly assumes
that the tax receipts are lump-sum redistributed in each period.
The above is a quadratic in i with a negative prime coefficient 22,sothe first-order condition
gives the optimal tax. One can think of the derivative of 17 as a sum of the derivatives with respect
to each period's consumption. Then the first-order condition for the optimal choice of p is
o=
(va(atSt)
pac+Sk(l _d)k(l +A*_l[(va(at+k,St+k) _pac)A*i +vs(at+kSt+k)])
(18)
20Dictatorshipof the present is normatively appealing only when all selves have the same preferences over streams
of consumption:
öU(S) (15)
Then, the most natural way to introduce hyperbolic discounting is to assume that self t puts a weight on consump-
tion in period t:
t5'U(a,cj,S1) + ötU(at,ct,St) (16)
Summing this social welfare function across all selves, we get back the previous utility function. That is, an additive
social welfare function is equivalent to one that takes the agent's long-run preferences as those relevant for welfare
analysis.
21Inthe language used to describe the policies, we will assume throughout that the addiction in question is harmful
in the no-tax setting—that is, consuming more today reduces future discounted utility. Because of the quadraticity of
the utility functions, this is not a necessary consequence of our model: for any a, there is a region where utility is
increasing in St. The results for these beneficial addictions should be symmetric to those below.
22Otherwisethe maximum utility would be infinite, a non-starter.
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St+k) -(p+r)c) + vs(at+k, St+k)]
whereTisthe unit tax on the consumption of the addictive good. Combining this with 18 and
rearranginggives
(1-)St(va(at,St)-(p+r)cc) (20)
Itis easy to show that the optimal tax is positive: the derivative of 17 at j.t=canbe written
in the form
öt(va(at,St)—pc+ö(l—d)V(St+1)), (21)
where VS (Se) stands for the exponentially discounted utility from leaving stock St and consuming
according to the sophisticated consumption function from then on. A hyperbolic discounter agent
solves va(at, St) —Pac+ 3(1 —d)V(St÷i)=0,and since by assumption V9(S+i) is negative, the
above derivative is negative for /3 <1.Therefore the optimal jz is lower than *3,andconsequently
the optimal tax is greater than zero.
There are several important additional implications for this case of sophisticates. First, since
the optimal tax is positive for /3 < 1, the left-hand side of the equation 20 is positive. But
va(at, S) —(p+ r)a >0means that the addiction is harmful—higher consumption lowers utility
from future periods. Therefore, at least in an average sense, the optimal tax is not so large so
as to make the addiction harmless on the margin. The reason is that the tax is there to correct
a marginal self-control problem. If there was no self-control problem (on average), there would
be nothing to correct—the agent's different intertemporal selves wouldn't disagree, so the losses to
consuming more would be second-order. But then, the selves would be consuming too little, since
their private costs are higher than the social costs due to the tax.
Second, we can also determine the dependence of the optimal tax on So. For any t, the total
derivative of va(at, S) with respect to S is aaaA*s+aas.Thisis greater than zero because )*5<AT.
30Therefore the derivative of the left-hand side of equation 20 with respect to So is positive, and so
the optimal tax is increasing in the level of initial addiction.
The reason for an optimal tax that is increasing in S0 follows from the nature of the tax. It is
solely a 'self-control tax,' or, in other words, a tax that is intended to aid in overcoming the agent's
self-control problem. As such, it has to increase as the self-control problem becomes more serious.
And in our model the marginal harm done by smoking more, and so the self-control problem,
increases with So.
Third, as a variation on this theme, one can ask what the government would do if it had access
to a time-variant tax, for example one that can be set differently in period 0 and the rest of the
periods. If the agent has already reached her steady-state consumption level when the first tax is
instituted, then the period-0 tax will be higher than the long-term tax. This occurs exactly because
the tax breaks the agent's habit, so S <So. For distributional reasons, the traditional prescription
is exactly the opposite. According to this view, a high up-front tax for cigarettes is undesirable
because it hurts addicted consumers too much, and these consumers tend to be disproportionately
poor. One should instead wait for these people to quit and then raise taxes high to make sure they
don't get readdicted. But this distributional concern should be dealt with separately from taxation
that is used as a self-control device; high up-front taxes perhaps combined with redistribution of
the resources to low income smokers would be a preferred strategy to phasing in the tax.
More generally, if taxes vary period to period, the first-order condition for the optimal choice
of 'rt,asa variant of condition 20, is
rta =—(1—)(k(i
—d)k(1+ *_l[(va(at+k,St+k) _pac)A*s +vs(at+kSt+k)])
— — d)A*si(1 —d)2(1+ A*s)zrt+i+jac. (22)
From this formulation, it is clear that if the good is sufficiently addictive, taxes in different periods
of time are substitutes, a consequence of the intertemporal complementarity in consumption levels.
Thus, if we think the taxes are too low in certain periods of life, due to addictivity taxes should
be higher than otherwise in earlier periods. Similarly, if the model is written over space, if we can't
regulate smoking in the home, we should overregulate it in other settings such as restaurants or
bars.
31We now return to the form of the social welfare function. It is important to note that the
exact form of the social welfare function is not as crucial as one might think, at least not to make
the point that the optimal tax should be positive. It is easy to prove that a small positive tax is
Pareto-improving—it increases the discounted utility of each intertemporal incarnation of the agent.
To see this, note first that a small decrease in a self's consumption causes a second-order loss to
her discounted utility, while a decrease in future selves' consumption gives a first-order gain. In
addition, future selves gain through the fact that they receive a lower stock of consumption S.
Of course, to get an actual tax, we still have to cardinalize how we weigh off different selves'
utilities. We remark on one alternative specification to the above, that of maximizing self 0's
discounted utility subject to the constraint that the tax is constant across periods. In this formu-
lation, the optimal tax is smaller than with an exponentially discounted social welfare function.
The reason is simply that with exponential discounting the social planner wants to correct every
self's self-control problem, including self 0's, whereas with hyperbolic discounting self 0 wants to
respect her own preferences and just correct future selves' behavior. In other words, self 0 wants the
government to leave her alone, and then tax the future selves so as to maximize the exponentially
discounted sum of utilities. Since the tax is restricted to be the same across periods, self 0 chooses
something between the two solutions.
8.3 Naifs
Let us move on to naifs. Rewrite equation 18 as
0 =S
(va(at
S)—(p+ r)a+5(1 —d)V$(S+1)+ (i +5k(i— d)k(1+ A*nt1A*m)ra)
(23)
where V' (St) is the exponentially discounted value function that results from naif consumption at
prices p + r.Furtherrewrite this as




32Knowing that naifs solve va(at, S) —(p+ r)ac+flS(1 —d)Vjc(St+i)=0,we can finally put the
first-order condition for naifs in the form
(1—fl)5 (v(aj, St)—p+r)ac) = — Afl)Tac+flb(l d)(V(St+i)Vjc(St+i)).
(25)
The naifs' first-order condition looks similar to that of sophisticates, equation 20, with the
last term on the right-hand side being the major difference. This term creeps in because naifs
perceive the wrong value function—they think a time-consistent agent's value function applies to
them, whereas the naif's does. For example, if the marginal utility of leaving more S is smaller in
reality than naifs think, that tends to increase the optimal tax.
The extra term generates important differences from the sophisticated case. First, it is not in
general true that if the addiction is harmful, then the optimal tax is greater than zero: it could be
the case that even though the addiction is harmful, naifs think it is even more harmful than it is
(0 > V41(St+i) > vfc(St+i)), so they consume too little. However, the possibility of a subsidy on
a harmful good is more of a theoretical curiosity than a real recipe. Since VTh(S) is dominated by
VT9S), for large S we have VS(S) <V795), so the optimal tax is greater than zero 23
Second,contrary to the optimal tax for sophisticates, it seems possible that >5t (v(a,,St) —
(p+ 'r)ac) <0, i.e. that the good appears beneficial on the average. The reason is that here the tax
not only corrects a self-control problem, but also a misperception problem—the agent is wrong in
predicting her future behavior. This is a very important qualitative difference in terms of optimal
taxation. Whereas in the sophisticated case taxation that eliminates all harmful consumption can
never be justified, even if the good is very addictive and people have severe self-control problems
(low fl's), it might be the best policy for the naive case 24Toput it in more plain terms, a
sort of 'cautious' paternalism is recommended for parts of the population that realize they have a
self-control problem, while a more 'short-leashed' policy should apply to those who don't.
Third, once again, we can easily show that the optimal tax is increasing in 5o For this, simply
note that the left-hand side of equation 25 is increasing, while the right-hand side is decreasing in
23Formally,this can be proven in a similar way to the sophisticated case.
24Tobe more precise, naifs will think that consuming the good is beneficial, whereas in reality it isn't. Thus, naifs
might say, 'There is no harm in smoking this one cigarette, so why don't you let me?', and they would be right—if
they really consumed according to their plans. Ultimately, they are not right because they don't think they'll get
addicted, and they will.
33So (we know Vs(St) <Vjsc(St)because VTC(St) dominates V'(S) for any t.) For naifs, both
their self-control problem and their overoptimism (their self-deceptive view of the value function)
get more problematic as So increases, so the optimal tax has to increase. Also, the optimal time
profile of the taxes would include a decreasing burden.
These results have particularly interesting implications for the age profile of government inter-
vention. Our finding that the optimal tax rises with the stock suggests taxes that rise with age; in
our model, older smokers are doing more harm to themselves than are their younger counterparts,
and therefore have a greater value for the self-control imparted by taxation. Over time, this age
profile could be flattened as individuals are broken of their addiction 25Onthe other hand, if
youths are naive and adults are sophisticated (or time-consistent), banning smoking for children
and not banning but taxing it for adults might be more appropriate, even if children are aware of
the negative health consequences of smoking 26Finally,if there are political or other constraints
on addressing smoking among adults, then the substitutability of taxes over time provides another
rationale for higher taxes or more regulation of smoking for youths.
8.4 A calibration exercise
In this section, we attempt to calibrate our model and calculate an actual optimal tax for sophis-
ticated agents. To do so, we will assume that the disutility associated with smoking is linear.
Let hs denote the money equivalent of the per-period future marginal utility of an extra cigarette
(so it should be negative.) Theoretically, there are two possible interpretations of this externality.
First, hs could be the pure utility effect of stock, vS(at+k, St+k). Alternatively, since a higher stock
leads the future self to reoptimize behavior, we can think of the externality taking into account
this change. In that case, h (va(at+k, St+k) —ixc)A*s +vs(at+k, St+k).Wewill calculate the
optimal tax according to the first interpretation, since we believe that the health data we will take
advantage of in this section corresponds more closely to that one. It is also the interpretation that
leads to a lower optimal tax.
25
Moreover,since the harm from a higher stock fades as individuals near death, optimal taxes may fall towards
the end of the life-cycle.
26
Indeed,children appear not only to know but to actually overestimate the dangers of smoking (Viscusi [35]).
Interestingly, they also grossly underestimate their own future propensity to smoke. This pair of beliefs is consistent
with what a naive hyperbolic discounter might think.
34Starting from equation 20 for the optimal tax, substituting on the left-hand side using the
sophisticates' first-order condition expressed in terms of stock, and then setting h =v3(at, St) for
each t gives








Notice that—contrary to a Pigouvian intuition—the optimal tax is smaller than 1 —3times the
marginal internality of the stock. The reason is the incentive effect. Even under optimal taxes, a
sophisticated agent feels a need to exert control on the future selves by consuming less. This effect
helps the government, and therefore it is not necessary to tax the full marginal externality.
One difficulty with estimating the optimal tax is parameterizing h3 (and He). Clearly, there
is a lot of disutility associated with smoking that is hard to quantify. Unpleasant consequences
in this category include coughing, increased vulnerability to various diseases, and the inability to
enjoy sports and food to the greatest possible degree. We will ignore all these, and assume that
the only disutility from smoking is in the increased chance of early death. In particular, we assume
that a cigarette costs a person seven minutes of life [21], and that the valuation of one year of life
is $100,000 [12]. At these figures, the cost in terms of life years lost per pack of cigarettes is $27.
Another serious difficulty lies in choosing the right period length for our purposes. The quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model is only a theoretical device meant to capture the essence of hyperbolic
discounting, and is not designed for actual policy simulations. In particular, it implicitly limits the
scope of intrapersonal conflict to exactly one period—there is no self-control problem within a period
or regarding future periods. The appropriate period length should be chosen taking these limitations
into account.
Since our empirical analysis was done in terms of a monthly time period, we will continue to work
with this time frame, and assume that /3 =0.9and 6 =1over this time period. Our choice of /3 is
intended to parameterize a modest time inconsistency problem—most of the psychological evidence
indicates that monthly discount rates are substantially higher than 10 percent. Physiological and
empirical evidence suggests that .X*Sisfairly high for smoking. Evidence is less clear on the
35depreciation rate.
Since the tax is quite sensitive to d and A*S, so table 6 shows the optimal tax for a few values. The
implied tax rates are still very high except for a combination of low d and high A*s. We haven't been
able to pin down d and A*s empirically, so we can't identify the relevant cell in table 6. However,
there is information in our data that can be exploited to rule out at least some combinations of d
and A: namely, the speed of convergence to a new steady state after an enacted and immediately
effective price change. A combination of low d and high A*Swouldimply that this convergence
is very slow—even long after the price change, agents should be reducing their consumption from
period to period. In particular, the change in smoking from month N + 1 to month 2N + 1 over
the change in smoking from month 1 to month N + 1 will equal (1 —d)N(l+ A*8)l.
In our sample the convergence to a new steady state seems relatively fast, ruling out a combi-
nation of high A*s and low d. For example, the consumption change from months 7 to 13 is only
about 0.08 of the consumption change from months 1 to 7. With d =0.5and ASS= 0.9,this figure
should be 0.74; even with d =0.5and A53 =0.7,the figure should be 0.38. This drop is compatible
with d =0.6and A58 =0.7.All exercises that we tried in this vein ruled out d =0.5and A58 =0.9,
while most also rule out d =0.5and A550.7. We can therefore safely put a lower bound on the
optimal tax at over a dollar per pack, and a reasonable number is perhaps closer to $1.50.
Moreover, this estimate is likely to be a lower bound; if we took into account the full internality,
not only the fatal health consequences of smoking, the tax would likely be much higher. And, as
noted earlier, we have chosen a degree of time inconsistency which is considerably lower than that
used in the previous literature.
On the other hand, if we use the second social welfare function, which aggregates the preferences
of today's hyperbolic agents, the optimal tax would be somewhat lower. But, for high delta, it will
be quite close, and for ö =1it will be the same. Our assumption of =1amounts to assuming an
infinite horizon, and in this case the optimal tax is not different for the two social welfare functions.
For <1,the difference is large for small fl's—for example, fi= 0gives a tax of zero for hyperbolic
preferences, which is not the case with exponential ones. The reason is that for a small fiself0
doesn't care about correcting other selves' self-control problem, but she does want the government
to leave her alone. With the time period we have chosen, 6 should be very close to 1, and /3 is not





too small, so this social welfare function should lead to essentially the same optimal tax.
We will not attempt to calculate the optimal tax for naifs, because that would involve making
assumptions about the degree of underestimation of the self-control problem. However, if there is
such underestimation, the tax for naifs is going to be higher, and much higher if the underestimation
is serious.
9 Conclusions
The theoretical and empirical insights of Becker and Murphy and of Becker, Grossman, and Murphy,
as well as subsequent work in the vein of their pioneering efforts, have greatly advanced the modeling
of addictive processes by economists. These are important and timely advances, as policy makers
are becoming increasingly interested in regulating addictive behaviors. In the case of cigarettes,
recent years have seen increased state taxation, regulation of smoking in public places, and a spate
of court cases brought by the states and now the Justice Department against the industry.
We have attempted in this paper to make two contributions to the literature on addiction.
First, we have suggested a more convincing framework for testing the central hypothesis of the
rational addiction model, that individuals are forward looking with respect to their decisions to
consume addictive goods. We find that announced but not yet effective tax increases lead to both
increased sales and decreased consumption of cigarettes, which is very consistent with forward
looking behavior by consumers. The use of announced price changes, and the robustness of our
finding to specification checks, provides the strongest evidence to date for adjacent complementarity.
Second, we have noted that the rational addiction framework embeds another important as-
37sumption besides forward-looking consumption behavior: time consistency. This assumption is at
odds with virtually all laboratory experiments and with a variety of casual real-world evidence on
smoking decisions. When we change the Becker and Murphy model to incorporate time inconsistent
preferences, we obtain predictions for price changes which are very similar to what are delivered
by their model. But we obtain radically different implications for policy. Instead of the standard
result that the optimal tax on cigarettes depends only on their associated externalities, we find that
there are substantial "internalities" as well which justify government intervention. For very modest
parameterization of these internalities, and ignoring any costs other than those associated with
the excess mortality of smoking, we find that there are sizable additional taxes suggested by these
internalities, on the order of $1 per pack or more. We also find that differences in the stock of past
smoking and the nature of time inconsistency across populations may call for very different types
of regulatory interventions, for example by age of smoker. In particular, if younger smokers are
either more "naive" than older smokers, or if there are political pressures that make it impossible
to tax appropriately smoking at older ages, it would justify tougher regulatory interventions for
youth smoking.
This result should not be surprising. The key feature of smoking, particularly in contrast to
other "addictive bads" such as drinking, is that its internal effects dwarf its external costs: the
vast majority of harm done by a smoker is to him or herself. At standard values of the value of a
life/year, we estimate above that a pack of cigarettes costs $27 in terms of lost life expectancy. If
even a small share of these internal costs are to be considered by government policy makers, the
resulting justification for intervention easily outweighs any externalities associated with smoking.
Of course, we have not proven time inconsistency in smoking decisions; we were unable to design
and implement a test that could effectively distinguish quasi-hyperbolic and exponential preferences
in this context. At the same time, the fact that there is no empirical support or even laboratory
support for exponential discounting in this or related contexts suggests that alternative models of
the type that we have derived be taken seriously. The important general point for thinking about
government policy in this context is that, when standard public finance analyses suggest that the tax
on addictive bads is simply equal to their external costs, those analyses are implicitly embracing a
rational addiction model. Given the enormous magnitude of the internal costs to smoking, however,
38alternative models such as ours must be considered seriously in designing regulatory policy towards
addictive goods.
39A Proofs of theorems
We start with a proof of lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Suppose U(Ct) and v(at, S) are differentiable and that a Markov-perfect subgame-perfect equilibrium with










Proof:Since instantaneous utilities and future selves' strategies are differentiable, self t's discounted utility is
differentiable in at 27 Furthermore, since an equilibrium exists, self t's maximization problem must have a solution.
Then, as self t's consumption of the addictive product is unrestricted, the derivative of her discounted utility at at is
zero. Therefore,
0=va(at,St)ptu'(ct)
+ o [vaat÷ist+i —pt÷iu'(ct÷i))(l _d)Oat+1 +v8(at+i,St÷i)(1 _d)]
ost+1
+/352(1— d)2






+35'(i _d)[J(i+,t÷) [(vo(at+iSt÷)_pt+u'(ct÷i))a +vs(at÷iSt+i)]
Thecomplicated second term on the right-hand side comes from the following consideration. It is trivial to prove
by induction that the derivative of S÷ with respect to at is (1 —d)tUII(i+ !-1i). Now this has two effects
on future instantaneous utility. First, it affects utility directly—the stock of past consumption is assumed to affect
current utility. That's the v8 (at+j, S,) term. Second, it affects utility through changing the consumption of self
t+ i.That's the (vo(at+t, S+) —pt+iU'(Ct+i))÷-term.
We can write the same optimality condition for self t + 1:
o =






Multiplying equation 30 by 5(1 —d)
(i+ and subtracting it from equation 30 we get
0 = va(at,St)—ptu'(ct)





Rearrangingthis gives the desired Euler equation. 0
27Notice that self t really only has one choice variable, because a choice of at ties down ct due to the no-saving
assumption.
40We pick up the discussion from the observation that for each t and each type of agent, at = AtS + utforsome
constants At and lit 28• Then
St÷1=(1—d)(St+at)=(l—d)(St+AtSt+iit) (32)
at+1=At÷1S÷1 +jt+i = A+1(1—d)(St+ AtSt +iLt)+.ut+1 (33)
Pluggingthis into thesophisticates' first-order condition, equation 28, and assuming pt = p ineachperiod:




Theabove hastobe true for all S, so the coefficient of St in the expression hasto be zero. After 'some' manipulation,
thisimplies
aaa—a00—P2acc 35 = —1 +
—a00 —P2acc+ 5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —fl)At+i)(aaoAt+i+ a08 + p2accAt÷i) —$a08At÷i
—$a83]
Thisis a backward recursion for the A's in the different periods. It looks quite scary, but can be understood with
some effort. That is what theorem 1 does.
Theorem 1 Suppose /3 and that U(at, Ct, St) is strictly concave. Then the backward recursion 35 converges,




—oo —p2acc+5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —/3)A')(a00A+ a03 + p2aA) —/3aasA*8
—
Furthermore,A8 > 0 if and only if
008 > 1_5(1_d)2(a (37)
Proof. Define the function f3(A) according to equation 35. We will prove that f3(AT) < Ar = —Qp2a'
f(—1)> —1, and that f is continuous and increasing on (—1, Ar). This is sufficient to establish that AT.. converges.
Thenclearly A38 > 0 if f3(0) > 0, which is equivalent to 13.
First, notice that the second term off3 (A) is the reciprocal of a quadratic with a negative coefficient on A2. Then
if this term is positive for two points on the real line, it is also positive in-between these two points. Moreover, it is
easy to show that on the interval where this term is positive, f3 isstrictly convex29. Therefore, it is sufficient to show
thatf8(—1) > —1,AT>fs(AT)> —1, and that f(—1) ￿ 0.Thefirst two ensure that we are on the continuous and
strictly convex section of f3, and the last one (together with convexity) ensures that f, is increasing on (—1, AT).
The rest is just carrying out the above. We have
1—1 a03—aaa—pacc 1 38 — — +
+ /35(1 —d)2[aa+ 2a08—p2acc—a38]
> —
asboth the numerator and the denominator are positive in thesecond term. Proceeding,
/ \ 2 a33 a08 —a00—Pacc fs(AT) = 2= 1+ 2 2 —a00 p aj —a00 p a, +5(1 d) [—/3a08Ar —13a88]
a035(1 —d)2[—/3a03AT—/3a33] (39) —a00 —p2acc+ 5(1 —d)2[—13a0,AT
—
28TObe more precise, for the solution to the first-order condition to give a maximum, we need strict concavity at each
stage. But we know that if a function C(at,St) isstrictly concave and continuously differentiable, then Ca(at,St)0
givesthe global maximum for a fixed S, and this maximum isstrictly concave in St.This consideration implies for
time-consistent agents that the previous period's problem is also strictly concave. Then for the sophisticated problem
to be strictly concave, notice that her value function starting in the next period is quadratic,and dominated by the
time-consistentagent's quadratic value function.
29Thesecond derivative of the reciprocal of a quadratic q is —q2q"2' )2,whichis positive as long as q is positive
andconcave.
41This being < Ai' =,2 isequivalent to —a08 AT — a > 0. But the latter can be rewritten as a <
ass (aaa+p2acc), and since owing to the concavity of U(at, Ct, St) we have a < a aao, this inequality holds.
a08AT — a > 0 also implies that the second term is positive, so that f(AT) > —1.
Finally,
fF ()(a— a00 — p2ac)(2(1 — /3)A(a00 + p2acc) + a00 + P2acc +(1— 213)a03)
40
— p2acc + 5(1 — d)Z[(1 + (1 —/3)A)(aaaA+ as+p2ctccA) — /3a08A —/3a88]]2'
which gives
1 — 1 2
a08 —a00— P2acc f — —( —
—a00 — p2acc + 5(1 —d)2[(1 +(1 — /3)A)(aaaA+ aas+ p2aA) — f3a03A —
￿ 0. (41)
This completes the proof. 0
Notethat the above proof doesn't work if U(aj, Ct, St) is not concave, possibly leading to 'wild' behavior on the
part of the agent. In particular, in that case one can't prove, and it's not in general true, that fs(AT)<AT. Also,
it is not the case that the backward program that just looks at first-order conditions at each stage finds a maximum
for every period. But in as much as it does, we can say the following. Carefully looking at the graph of f3(A), it
seems possible that A_ first increases, then jumps to around —1, then starts increasing again, restarting the cycle.
Behaviorally, this means that the agent goes through periods of addiction followed by brutal 'cold turkey' types of
quits, a phenomenon described by Becker and Murphy [3].
Theorem 2 A ￿ A3 ￿ ASTC
Proof. To prove A8 ￿ XtTC, define fTc as f3 except with /3 =1.The difference between the denominators of
the second terms of f5 and fTc, ignoring the positive multiplicative constant 5(1 — d)2, is
fa00 a030 \fA\
(1— /3) [A2 (aaa + p2acc) + 2aasA + a53] =(1— j3)(A 1 pA) (a05a350)(1
)<0 (42)
\.00 acJ\pAJ
bythe concavity of U(at,ct,St). This implies that for any A E (—1,AT), f8(A) > fTc(A), and thus At3 ￿ A.TC.




where the superscripts refer to the two different agents. Since the utility function is quadratic and strategies are
linear, both of these are quadratic in Furthermore, it is clear that VTc(St+i) ￿ V8(St..i) for all S÷1, so
VTC (St+i) has at least as large a prime coefficient as V3 (St+i). In addition, these coefficients are negative 30•
Agenti (i =n,s) solves
maxv(at,St)+u(It —pat)+/3V'((l —d)(St +at)), (44) at
leadingto the first-order condition
v0(at,St) —pu'(ct) + /3(1 — d)V(St+j) =0. (45)
Differentiating this totally with respect to St gives
Oat— vas(at,St)+i35(1d)2Vs(St+i)
OSt — —v00(at, St) —p2u"(ct)— /35(1 — d)2V5(S÷i)
——1+ v03(at,St) —v00(at,St) —p2u"(ct) (46)
—v00(at,St) —p2u"(ct) —/35(1 —d)2V5(S+i)
Since v03, —U", —V00, and —V are positive constants, and —V ￿ _Vjc, the above implies At's￿A8. 0
30The easiest way to see this is to check that VIC (S+i) =5v3(am, S) is negative for a sufficiently high St+.
Alternatively, refer to an earlier footnote on the strict concavity of value functions.
42B The responsiveness to price and its implications
B.1 Deriving price responsiveness
Condition 34 implies for sophisticates
8 Ptac—pt+iac(1
—d)S(1+ (1 —/3)At÷i) =constant—
—a00+ 5(1 —d)2[(l+ (1 —/3)Aj÷i)[a00At÷i+ a03] —/9a08At+i—/3a]
(1 —d)S[/3a08
—(1+ (1 —/3)At+i)a00] 8 +
+ 5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —i3)At+i)[a0aAt+i+ a03] —/3a08At÷i—/3a]t+1
Thelimit of the coefficient of 14+1inthe expression exists and is equal to
(1 —d)5[13a03
—(1+ (1 —13)A8)a00] 48
—a00 + 5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —f3)A)[aaaA 8+cr0,] —/3a,A
8—
whichis clearly positive. It is easy to see that in general converges if and only the above limit is less than 1.
Lemma 4 pirT converges.
Proof. Suppose not. Then one can easily choose parameters so that diverges, i.e. IT I —4. Now
consider any S. There are real numbers M and N such that for a small enough t, M < VtTc(S) <N. The lower
bound comes from the consideration that one can just consume 1-4-S in each period (the steady-state consumption
corresponding to S), giving a discounted utility .jiv( j-5,S) + a(I —p-4-S) in the limit. The upper bound comes
from the fact that U(at, Ct, S) is strictly concave quadratic, and thus has a global maximum. (Note that this also
implies that N can be chosen independently of S.)
Now since -4 oo,also VTc(S)l = lvs(aT3,S)l -4. Butsince lim,0 VTC(S) = a +
O05A*TC, this contradicts that the value function is bounded from above. 0
From the naifs' first-order condition
= constant— ptac—pt+icsc(1—d)/35




+ /35(1 —d)2[a00A + a08—tZ,3A —
andsince ji,andATTconverge,so does Thuswe have established the following theorem:
Theorem 1 If prices are constant over time, i4?, and j4 converge.
Call the limits /j•TC and if". Unfortunately, for sophisticates we don't necessarily get convergence. To see this,
rewrite 48 as
(1 —d)5[a08 — a00]
—a00 + 5(1 —d)2[(1 +(1 —/3)A*8)[a0oA*8 +] —/3a08A'—ha83]
(1 —d)5(1—/3)(a00A3+ a03)
(50)
—a00 + 5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —/3)A8)[aA.8 + aas} —f3a03A—
As/3 —+0,this approaches (1 —d)5(1+ AT), which can easily be greater than 1If diverges, the model
exhibits certain 'violent' characteristics (for example, there would be huge consumption reactions to even minimal
price changes, possibly even in the 'wrong' way), which we don't want to deal with. Therefore we make a sufficient
assumption for 48 to be less than 1. We assume that (1 —d)5(1+ A3) < 1. By the continuity of A with respect to
[3, this is true if /3 is sufficiently close to 1.
We will use the following lemma extensively to study consumption responses to price changes.
Lemma 5 For a recursion of the form zi = I + kx with 0 <k < 1 we have
d. 1 —limx3=—. (51)
w3—+ooI—
31Eventhough we have not proved that A_ converges for small /3's, it probably does for most parameter values.
Even if it doesn't, it is clear that agents who ignore the future should have a A = AT.
43Proof. An easy geometric argument. 0
Wewill consider permanent price decreases of Lp that start either last period, this period, next period, or two
periods into the future. A direct application of lemma 5 yields a consumption response to a present permanent
decrease in price for sophisticates of
(52)
where
m8 = —a + 5(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —/3)At+i)[aa0A+i+ a08] —/3a08At+i—$a38],
k — (1
—d)5[/3a08
—(1+ (1 —/3)At+j)a00] (53) —
—aaa+ 6(1 —d)2[(1+ (1 —/3)At+i)[aaaAt+i+ a03] —/3a03At+i
—/3a33]
If the price change is next period, t+ichangesby the same amount as if it was this period, so the change in tis
also the same except for a term
.pa,1—(1—d)6(1+(1—/3)A8) L.pac (54) m' 1—k m8
For time-consistent agents, the expressions are similar, but they reduce nicely because in that case k = (1 —d)6(1+
A*TC). The most convenient forms are given in table 7.
The problem is somewhat different for naifs. From equation 49
= constant —pa(l—(1— d)/35)+ (1 —d)35(1+ ).n).TC (55)
where
rn" = —a00 + /35(1 —d)2[a00A8TC+ Z,3 —aa3A8TC—a88] (56)
With a price change, the last term changes due to a change in 8TC, and the second-to-last directly due to the price
change. Taking the change in *TC from table 7, the response to a present permanent decrease in price is
(1 —d)3S(1+ A")1— +(1 —/36(1
—d)). (57)
Noting that= and -= thisbecomes
pac(l + ATh) [(1 —d)/36(1 —(1 —d)5)(1 +A8TC)+ 1 —85 1 —d
aa8 —aaa L 1—(1
—d)6(1+ )8TC)
( )
—pa(1+ As") (1 —d)I3SA8TC+ 1 —(1—d)5(1+ ).TC) 58 —
a03—a00 1 —(1—d)S(1+ A8TC)





B.2 Estimating (5 from price responses
As we have mentioned, estimating S from the information available to us is not as easy as dividing the responses to
future and past price changes, as Becker, Grossman, and Murphy [4] claim. In our setup, that ratio is easily derived
from table 7:
SA*Tc
(1 +A.TC)(1 —(1 —d)S)' (60)
For this to be equal to 6, one would need 1 —(1
—d)t5(1+ )%8TC)0, which is not possible by lemma 4. In general,
to recover 6, one needs to estimate d and A*TC, as we do in appendix C.
The BGM [4] method of calculating 5 only works in general if the price changes in question are temporary 32jf
they are permanent, it works if d = 1, since this makes prices further away irrelevant for today's smoking decision—in
two periods, the effects of today's consumption will have disappeared.
32From expression 47, the response to a future temporary price increase is (1 —d)SXTCtimes the response to an
equivalent current temporary price increase, while the response to a past increase is (1 —d)A*Tctimes as much.
44Table 7: Summary of price responses






















C A test of time consistency
C.1Recoveringd and )
For all threetypes, theresponse to a past price change is 1+(1 —d)Atimes the response to a current price
change, since the constant f%changesby the same amount but there is a change in S due to the change in last
period's consumption. Therefore, looking at consumption responses to present vs. past price changes, one can recover
(1 —d)A*.
In addition, it is easy to show that steady-state consumption for type i is
a = (61)
Thus comparing the steady-state change in consumption with the instantaneous one identifies This,along
with the earlier estimate of (1 —d)xt,let us get at d and A.
C.2The test
We operate under the null hypothesis of time consistency. Using the above estimates for d and lstartc, we can
estimate 5 from the ratio of responses to price changes today versus one period ahead. Let the estimates be denoted
by hats. Now, from table 7, the null hypothesis of time consistency implies that the ratio of responsiveness to price
changes two periods versus one period ahead is equal to (1 —d)5(1+ A3Tc). So the null hypothesis would be that
this ratio is equal to (1 —d)5(1+ ATC). We prove that the alternative hypothesis of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
implies that the ratio is greater than (1 —I)(1+ )%.TC).
Naifs: Clearly, the above method yields the correct d and Fromtable 7 we get that when S is calculated





1—(1 —d)5(1 + (1 _fi)A3TC)
We first prove that 1 <5.SinceA' > )*TC' and the left-hand side of equation 62 is increasing in 5, for this it suffices
to show that
/3 1




Using that (1 —d)5(1+ )1.Tc) < 1 (which follows from lemma 4), one can expand this inequality, and after brief
manipulation it in turn reduces to (1 —d)5(1+ A3TC) < 1. Therefore 5 <5. The following lemma provides the result
on which the proposed empirical test relies.
Lemma 6 (1 —d)8(1 + A') <(1 —d)5(1 +XT(Y).
45Proof. Start from equation 62. Cross-multiplying and rearranging gives
1 d — (1 —(1—d))(1—(1




Sincet5<8and A*TC > 0, the above is less than
1 —(1—(1
—d)6(1+ TC)) =(1—d)ö(1+ \*TC)) (65)
0
Sophisticates: We can move straight to the lemma that establishes the validity of the proposed empirical
test. The lemma in this case requires an extra assumption—the same assumption that we needed to ensure that the
sophisticated model is not too 'wild.'
Lemma 7 If (1 —d)5(1+ A) <1, then k> (1 —d)(1+ A3).
Proof. Start from the equivalent expression to the naive case, pulled from table 7:
(1 —d)Ak —(1—d)ö(1+ (1 3)A) (66)
1—(1—d)5 1_(1_d)5(1+(1_f3)A.8)
Multiplying out and rearranging gives
1 d 5 1\*8—k—(1
—d)ö(1+ (1 —3)A8)1 d t
k—1
67 -)( + )1-(1-d)8(1+(1-f3)A')-(- _____________
Thisbeing less than k is equivalent to
k_(1_d)ö(1+(1_3)8)_(1_d)k+(1—d)<k(1_(1_d)ö(1+(1_,3)A8)), (68)
which reduces to
8(1 + (1 —3)A)> (69)
Using equation 66 and noting that its left-hand side is increasing in ,thisis equivalent to
(1 —d)8(1+ (1 —fA)A*ak —(1—d)ö(1+ (1 —I3)A) 70
1— (1 —d)6(1+(1—3)A)> 1 —(1 —d)8(1+(1—3)A) ( )
The above easily becomes
(1—d)ö(1+(1—f3)A8)(1+A) > k, (71)
But easily k = (1 —d)8(1 + A) —(1— d)ö(1 —f3)°' <(1— d)8(1 +A8), completing the proof. 0
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 Table 2: Length of Time Between Enactment and Effective Dates of Excise Tax Increases
1973-1996 1982-1996 1989-1996
(Full dataset) (Packs/Capita (Natality Data
Available) Available)
Same Month 36 27 14
Consecutive Months 44 38 18
1 Month Between 23 19 11
2 Months Between 27 21 12
3 Months Between 9 6 2
4 Months Between 6 5 2
5MonthsBetween 2 2
7 Months Between 1 1 1
Multiple Changes, 4 4 3
<1 year Between
Multiple Changes, 8 8 5
> 1Year Between
Notes: Source is authors' tabulations of data on state excise tax enactment and effective dates.
Each row shows number of tax changes with the noted length of time between enactment and
effective dates. Last two rows refer to tax events where multiple future changes are enacted at















Cigs/Day if Smoke 12.24
(1.19)
Effective Tax Rate 0.187
(0.096)
Number of Births Per State/Month Cell 5319
(4945)
Number of Observations 4,446
Notes: Tabulations of monthly packs/capita and Natality cigarette consumption data. Standard
deviations in parentheses.Table 4: Effect of Tax Announcement on Smoking -FixedEffects Models
Aggregate Sales Data Natality Consumption Data
Effective Rate -7.998 -14.13 -0.660 -0.215
(0.306) (1.664) (0.050) (0.226)
[-0.803] [-1.502] [-0.347] [-0.113]
Enacted Rate 2.307 -0.344
(1.066) (0.142)
[0.232] [-0.181]
Effective Rate 4.001 -0.118
(-2) (1.330) (0.180)
[0.402] [-0.062]
Number of Obs 8678 8675 4342 4341
Notes: Coefficients from regression of consumption on listed variables, as wellas a full set of
dummies for state of residence and calendar month of data. Standard errors inparentheses;
implied price elasticities in square brackets. Regressions for aggregate packs/capita data in first
two columns; regressions for natality cigarette consumption data in second two columns. All
regressions exclude month of enactment of tax increase and month that it is effective.Table 5: Effect of Tax Announcement on Smoking -AlternativeModels




































Number of Obs 8383 4182
Notes: Coefficients from regression of consumption on listed variables,as well as a full set of
dummies for state of residence and calendar month of data. Firstpanel presents fixed trends
regressions, which include as well a full set of state-specific time trends; second panelpresents
differences regressions, which include just month dummies. Standarderrors in parentheses;
implied price elasticities in square brackets. Regressions for aggregate packs/capita data in first
two columns; regressions for natality cigarette consumption data in second two columns. All
regressions exclude month of enactment of tax increase and month that it is effective.